No water in Teesta: Mamata

Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh was excited about the huge achievements of the visit. He said in his media meeting after the Summit level talks that so many agreements, MOUs, etcetera were signed that it was difficult for him to keep count. He named 35 but was reminded by the Indian journalists that the number was less, 22 in fact. That prompted him to ask the Indian journalists to refer the issue of number to their side. He of course failed to tell what millions in Bangladesh were waiting to hear that was what had happened to the Teesta deal.

Mamata Banarjee answered that query. She made it clear that as long as she was the Chief Minister of West Bengal, there was little chance of the Teesta deal being delivered to Bangladesh. She said after the Treaty was once again shelved with the polite assurance from Prime Minister Narendra Modi that it would be delivered “soon”, that the Teesta River was the heart of her people and there was no question that they would allow their heart to be ripped apart. She also said that there was no water in the Teesta to share and offered waters of other rivers to Bangladesh. She also suggested new studies for augmenting the water of the Teesta River.

In explaining away their failure to sign the Teesta deal nonchalantly, the Indians, including both New Delhi and Kolkata, perhaps forgot that there were sensible people in Bangladesh (and abroad and even in India itself) for whom the way the Indians dismissed the deal to permanent uncertainty was a bluff, a betrayal, and therefore not acceptable. When Sheikh Hasina had assumed power in January 2009, she had extended to India what New Delhi wanted from Bangladesh since 1971, that it would allow, first a permanent transit from mainland India to the Seven Sisters and that its security concerns from its eastern borders would be forever gone.

Only take no give!

Sheikh Hasina delivered both at great political risks to end decades of bad relations with the country that had helped the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign nation. Her government unilaterally handed to India 7 ULFA terrorists that had a great impact in controlling the growing threat from the ULFA terrorists. It also took the necessary steps so that Bangladesh could provide to India, land transit.

Bangladesh did not seek reciprocity for its Prime Minister bold moves. Nevertheless, it was only natural that Bangladesh expected concessions from India on its critically needed water required from the commonly shared rivers. The positive attitude of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was reflected in the Joint Declaration that was signed during her state visit to India in January 2010 that raised hopes in Bangladesh that India would reciprocate, particularly in the issue of water.

Thus leading up to the Indian Prime Minister’s return visit to Dhaka in September 2011, Bangladesh continued to provide India more access to jointly build the infrastructure for land transit.  Bangladesh also worked hand in glove with India on the latter’s security concerns. On its part, India not only began negotiations on the Teesta positively, it gave Bangladesh an offer that was unexpected. It promised to share the water of the Teesta 50/50 in the dry season after reserving 20% for navigability of the river. In all earlier negotiations, the best India had offered was a 28% of Teesta water in the dry season.

That offer only encouraged Bangladesh to negotiate with India with greater sincerity. Bangladesh was also greatly encouraged by the case the Indians had built about land transit; that land transit would make Bangladesh the connectivity hub of the region out of which so much money and economic resources would flow that Bangladesh would not even need to charge India any fee for using land transit facilities.  In fact, one of the three top Bangladesh officials who had negotiated with India between 2009-2011 had said that it would be “uncivilized” for Bangladesh to ask any transit fees from India. Another had said compared to the financial/economic benefits that would accrue by becoming the connectivity hub, the charges for transit would be “peanuts.”

Teesta, an international river

Therefore India’s decision to withdraw the Teesta deal the night before the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Dhaka in September 2011 was seen as a betrayal even by many foreign policy analysts of India.  The argument that Mamata Banarjee’s intransigence was responsible was a very lame excuse because the Indian side did not alert the Bangladesh side of the problem even up to the time the Indian’s withdrew the deal. In fact, Foreign Minister Dipu Moni insisted that the deal would be signed on schedule because she could not believe that the Indians would take the deal off the table at literally the 11th hour without any warning.

The Indians had blamed Mamata Banarjee arguing that in the Indian Constitution, water was a provincial subject and thus New Delhi was powerless when a state decided against New Delhi on a water issue.  It was really not the case for unlike the US federation where the states formed the union and were given a great deal of power under the Constitution, in India’s quasi-federal Constitution, the Center was made more powerful deliberately because of the fragile nature of the Indian federation. Moreover, the Teesta deal involved an international river where Bangladesh had rights that India could not withhold because of the wishes of a state. The Indian constitution had given the states rights over waters of cross state boundary rivers but not over the international rivers and most definitely from meddling in foreign affairs.

Therefore, under the Centre’s constitutional right over foreign relations and international agreements and treaties, New Delhi could have easily overridden West Bengal’s argument of constitutional rights over waters of cross-state rivers that did not extend to international rivers. Furthermore, New Delhi had the power of the purse over the states that was a formidable weapon that New Delhi could have used to convince Mamata Banarjee that her obstinacy n relations.

Delhi didn’t even try

Nevertheless, even after India had failed to deliver the Teesta in 2011, Bangladesh remained committed to improvement of bilateral relations with India. After the initial disappointment, Bangladesh also offered India the use of the Chittagong and Mangla seaports for the economic development of the Seven Sisters. India’s gestures after its betrayal on the Teesta were financial incentives. It had given a $1 billion as soft loan before Manmohon Singh’s visit to Dhaka and pitched another soft loan of the same amount after its failure to deliver the Teesta. The two loans remained largely unspent and whatever was spent, had been to buy Indian goods for development of the land transit infrastructure leading to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s just concluded visit to New Delhi.

There were no visible signs that New Delhi had made any serious efforts leading to her latest visit to resolve the Teesta deadlock. In fact, it appeared from media reports that New Delhi expected that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina would herself convince Mamata Banarjee at the dinner to which the President of India had invited her! It was unbelievable that New Delhi would reciprocate with the Bangladesh Prime Minister who had taken great political risks to befriend India.

Quite expectedly nothing happened in the Sheikh Hasina-Mamata Banarjee meeting. Instead, the West Bengal Chief Minister introduced new elements of uncertainty that left serious analysts of Bangladesh-India relations without doubt that Bangladesh’s only chance of ever getting the Teesta deal would materialize only when New Delhi decided to seriously pressure Mamata Banarjee on the basis of its constitutional role in foreign affairs and its power over the states with the control of the purse instead of making lame excuses.

Teesta vis-à-vis defence deal

There was very little reason of course for New Delhi to use those powers leading to the Bangladesh Prime Minister’s visit because it was aware ahead of the visit that the Bangladesh side would not sign the Defence Treaty. India had been trying for the Treaty for quite some time. The Indian Defence Minister had come to Dhaka in December with the Deputy Chiefs of the three defence services of India that was not just unfruitful; they had left with the impression that Bangladesh’s defence forces were not yet ready for it. And so were the majority of the people of Bangladesh.

Nevertheless, the failure to sign the Treaty was a big disappointment for India not in the context of its relations with Bangladesh but in the context of its strategic interests vis-à-vis China and the region. China had been making fast strides in building its economic and military strength and leaving India far behind. China had sent a strong message to India by sending its Defence Minister to Sri Lanka and Nepal where anti-Indian sentiments are on the rise.

India, therefore, needed the Defence Pact with Bangladesh badly to send a message to China about its role in South Asia. Furthermore, India also needed the Pact to ensure that should China decide to make the waters in the Seven Sisters muddy by encouraging the separatists there, it would have the land route through Bangladesh to deal with such an intention.

Therefore, India’s desire and failure to get the Defence Pact with Bangladesh had no doubt taken away even the slimmest chances of the Teesta Deal till Bangladesh was ready to sign the Pact. And Mamata Banarjee once again helped New Delhiby taking the blame upon herself and placed the last nail in the Teesta coffin when she suggested that new studies would be required to determine the quantum of water in the river!

Advani underlined Teesta’s importance

For Bangladesh, water was at the heart (and soul) of sustainable and friendly Bangladesh-India relations. For India, it was its security concern. The visit of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, notwithstanding all the departure from protocol and the flurry of agreements/MOUs etcetera signed during the visit, did not bring what was now indispensable for sustainable relations with its neighbours.  At the reception in her honour by the India Foundation where former Deputy Prime Minister LK Advani was present underlined unequivocally that water sharing was the key to sustainable Bangladesh-India relations and thus also underlined her frustrations with the visit.

Bangladesh’s needs from India for sharing of the waters of the common rivers was both legal under international law and convention and ecologically of absolutely the highest importance for it’s 160 million people’s livelihood and existence. It was based on those facts that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had shown the political will over the last 8 years while protecting the country’s sovereignty. India’s failure to give Bangladesh the Teesta deal was a betrayal given the political risks the Bangladesh Prime Minister took to encourage India to build mutually beneficial bilateral relations.

India’s proposal for the defence treaty to which it tied Bangladesh’s water needs was of a totally different nature.  Bangladesh was under no threat of external aggression to warrant a defence treaty with India or for that matter with another country.On top of all that, an unnecessary defence treaty with India would have been seen by China, a long and trusted friend of Bangladesh and an adversary of India, as directed against it.

In what could only be underlined either as India’s insensitivity towards its neighbours or fall in their standard of conducting foreign relations, India made it appear like providing Bangladesh financial incentives was enough to appease both its the Government and its people. It was an expression of baniya mindset in the conduct of foreign relations.

Hasina shows maturity

On financial incentives, Bangladesh was well aware that India had offered $2 billion in financial incentives for its failure to fulfill its commitment on Teesta and that a major part of that incentive package had remained unutilized. And whatever part of it was spent was utilized for India’s benefit for buying Indian goods and services for the development of infrastructure to implement the land transit agreement.

Our Prime Minister showed grace and political wisdom in the face of India’s baniya mindset and insensitivity. In the reception hosted by the India Foundation that was attended among others by former Deputy Prime Minister of India, LK Advani, she did not complain about India’s failure to keep its commitment over Teesta once again. She simply underlined that the key to sustainable and mutually beneficial Bangladesh-India relations was embedded in just sharing of the waters of the common rivers, starting with the Teesta.

Without flagging explicitly, she left no Indian in doubt that India had not shown any interest to resolve the main issue that stood in the way of sustainable and mutually beneficial bilateral relations.  In fact, New Delhi had made it now more difficult to resolve the Teesta Deal by allowing Mamata Banarjee have her absurd ways to take the upper hand from New Delhi on an issue that related to foreign affairs, a constitutional power in which a state had just no business to meddle.

The Prime Minister sent to New Delhi the message of her disappointment over her visit in a manner that only underlined her maturity as a political leader. She ordered her Party to cancel the civic reception for her upon her return home and underscore without uttering a word that India had betrayed her and the people of Bangladesh. In fact, in cancelling the proposed reception, she highlighted that she had quietly protected the country’s sovereignty by not succumbing to New Delhi’s pressure for the defence pact and answered the opposition’s accusation of selling Bangladesh’s interests to its big neighbour.

Ball is in India’s court

The just concluded visit of the Bangladesh Prime Minister to India was a watershed. It made clear to New Delhi that its one-way conduct of relations without meeting Bangladesh’s critical needs and interests, particularly on water, was not acceptable anymore. In fact, it also exposed the limits of Indian influence in Bangladesh and it did that with its ill-considered proposal of the Defence Treaty. India found out that the people and the defence forces of Bangladesh were ready to go any length with a friendly India but not with India that did not care what happened to Bangladesh for its interests because the defence treaty would have served India’s interest 100% and led its most trusted friend China to believe that it was joining its adversary India, against it.

The Prime Minister of Bangladesh put the ball of sustainable Bangladesh-India relations in India’s court. It would now be up to India to show the political will of the Bangladesh Prime Minister to move relations forward that money would not help but trust in which India had failed.